Multi-sided platforms (MSPs), which bring together two or more interdependent groups of customers, have recently risen to economic and business prominence in many industries. This paper first lays out a simple micro-founded framework which aims to organize academic and managerial thinking about MSPs. It argues that any MSP performs one or both among two fundamental functions: reducing search costs and reducing shared transaction costs among its multiple sides. Using a variety of illustrations, the framework is then used to formulate general principles driving MSP design and expansion strategies: choosing the relevant platform "sides", deciding which fundamental activities to perform and trading off depth against scope of MSP functions.
Introduction
The term "platform" has become increasingly popular with executives today: many companies claim to be "a" or "the" platform in their respective industries. This generally comes from the realization that platforms, and in particular multi-sided platforms (MSPs) -those that serve the needs of interdependent constituents: eBay for buyers and sellers;
Microsoft Windows for application developers, PC makers and PC users; shopping malls for retail shops and shoppers; digital media services for content owners and users, etc. -occupy privileged positions in their respective industries. Examples include Microsoft, eBay, Rakuten, Google, etc.
MSPs have existed for centuries -for instance of the village market and matchmakers.
However, their prominence has soared only recently, mostly because of information technology, which has tremendously increased the opportunities for building larger, more valuable and powerful platforms. At the same time, by expanding the potential scope of platforms, technology has also increased the number and complexity of the factorseconomic and technical-that drive the strategic design of MSPs. Deciding who are the relevant groups of customers for the MSP and the fundamental services the platform needs to perform for those customers are critical to an MSP's success, even before it is launched and priced. Yet, although many companies play up the platform card, surprisingly few rigorously analyze the underlying drivers of their MSPs, instead relying on vague statements about "platforms" and "network effects" in order to capture the attention (and imagination) of would-be investors. The emerging business and economics literature on two-sided markets up to now has not been of much help in this direction either, as it has mostly focused on pricing and competition between platforms 2 , taking their existence as given and without tackling broader strategic questions regarding design, vertical and horizontal scope of MSPs.
This article starts by providing a general framework designed to help organize managerial thinking about MSPs. Given the diversity of industries in which they operate and the variety of forms MSPs can take, it is useful to be aware of their common denominator -the fundamental functions they perform. In particular, we argue that no matter the industry, any MSP serves one or several among three fundamental purposes. We then apply this micro-founded framework to formulate general principles driving MSP design and expansion strategies. What are the relevant platform "sides" (or constituents)? Which activities should the platform perform for those constituents and which should be foregone? How should an MSP trade off depth vs. scope in its functions?
A micro-founded framework for analyzing MSPs
The first step in designing a MSP is to understand what MSPs do.
An MSP provides a support that facilitates interactions (or transactions) among the two or more constituents (sides) that it serves, such that members of one side are more likely to get on board the MSP when more members of another side do so.
In other words, there are positive indirect network effects among the various customer groups that an MSP brings together. Note that the notion of customer groups is very different from the notion of customer segments. The relevant customer groups (or sides) for the Xbox videogame console are the end users and the independent game developers. But within the user side one can distinguish between, say, the teenager segment and the young adult segment (22-29 years old). Xbox has greater value for any user of any of these two segments the more games are developed for the console (and viceversa, it is a more attractive platform for independent game developers if it has a larger installed base of users). There might also exist direct network effects, whereby Xbox users may care about how many other usersusually within the same customer segment -have an Xbox.
It is however the requirement of exhibiting indirect network effects that is absolutely essential in order to have a true MSP and not a single-sided platform (which usually exhibits economies of scale), a distinction managers oftentimes gloss over. To illustrate the difference, consider Amazon, a platform connecting merchants of increasingly varied kinds of products to consumers. The more merchants Amazon draws to one of its numerous affiliation programs (zShops, Merchants@Amazon.com, Merchants.com Cloud and Mechanical Turk are or become Amazon-affiliated merchants, then the answer is yes; otherwise they will not contribute to increasing Amazon's user traffic. Obviously, the Holy Grail is to have both economies of scale and indirect network effects, which is why Amazon is working hard to make its new infrastructure services as appealing as possible to its merchants.
The Amazon example shows that even the value of the most innovative one-sided platforms can be substantially enhanced if they are leveraged into MSPs and therefore generate indirect network effects in addition to economies of scale. This is achieved by strategically designing platforms to appeal to multiple sides. And strategic design hinges crucially on the choice of platform functionalities.
3 See Leschly et al. (2003 
Reducing search costs
Search costs are costs incurred by the multiple sides before they actually interact, in order to determine the best "trading partners". These can be further divided into two types, according to whether each of the two (or multiple) sides is searching for each other or only one is.
In two-sided matchmaking contexts, both sides are searching for each other: men and women on www.match.com, buyers and sellers on eBay. By contrast, platforms that reduce one-sided search costs are making audiences for the searching side while providing a standalone service to the non-searching side (the audience). This is essentially the case with advertising platforms, which allow advertisers to reach an audience of consumers. For example, viewers watch TV for content and the resulting audience is sold to advertisers.
Similarly, people go to Google to search websites and advertisers pay for the privilege of having their sponsored links appear on the top right hand side of the results pages for correlated searches.
Reducing search costs in a two-sided matchmaking setting generally means reducing two-sided asymmetric information, which makes "sampling" of candidates for "transactions"
easier. Here the network effects go in both directions: the more men affiliate with match.com -which requires them to provide some basic personal information in order to be able to search the database -, the more valuable affiliation with the site becomes for women, since they can search a larger database of men. And it also works the other way around. Note that network effects could vanish if match.com allowed people to search without registering:
when a man (woman) searches the site without registering, other women (men) do not get any benefit from his (her) presence.
MSPs generally go beyond simple aggregation of databases (or portals in the case of content) when they wish to make sampling and search easier. Many reduce asymmetric information further by engaging in "quality certification" of at least one side, a process which can take various forms. One of the most restrictive is that adopted by videogame consoles, which maintain a very tight control over what games get published. NTT DoCoMo, Japan's leading mobile operator, has chosen a softer form for i-mode, its mobile Internet service: it endorses only a fraction of the content providers for i-mode, labeling them official; the rest is not excluded, but are known to be unofficial content. An even softer certification is that created by eBay, which allows buyers to rate sellers as opposed to certifying them itself.
Finally, some MPSs such as Microsoft's Windows dispense with certification altogether, presumably because they believe asymmetric information is not an issue in their markets.
Audience-making MSPs generally reduce search costs by making it easier for the searching side to provide information about new products or services to the audience on the other side. The key difference with the two-sided matchmakers is that here indirect network effects mostly flow in one direction only: advertisers care about the audience's size and homogeneity along certain characteristics they can use (both of which increase the targeting effectiveness of the advertising medium), but the value the audience derives from the MSP typically does not depend on the number of advertisers in the best case and may even decrease in that number (negative externality of advertising) in some cases.
The distinction between these two types of search cost reductions is important because the implications for design are different. When only side A values reaching side B (and side B is indifferent to side A's presence), the platform provider needs to be extra careful when adding functionalities which make this process easier for side A, so as not to compromise the service or product offered to side B. As an example, Google made a conscious decision not to allow pictures or videos in the sponsored ad space, precisely in order not to degrade the consumer search experience, for which relevance is key.
Reducing shared costs
The second fundamental function is to reduce the costs incurred during the transactions themselves, i.e. after search is over and the transacting parties have found each other. A portion of these costs is generally common to all transactions between different members of the relevant sides of the MSP, which is why we call them "shared" or "duplicate" costs. The immediate benefit of this general framework is to provide a simple and unified
way of thinking about all MSPs, regardless of the industry(ies) in which they operate.
However, the most useful practical application comes from using it systematically to analyze how the individual strategic and operational activities a company is (or should be)
performing map into the fundamental MSP functions. It can help uncover valuable expansion opportunities and difficult tradeoffs that need to be made when designing MSPs.
From one-sided businesses to MSPs
There are many products or services which are one-sided, i.e cater to only one customer group, but which hold the potential to be expanded into an MSP by offering to reduce the costs associated with transactions between their existing customers and new customer groups. The trick is of course to spot such new customer groups that can be linked profitably to your platform.
A case in point is Lawson, Japan's second-largest convenience store chain, which was a one-sided business until 2000, when it decided to start leveraging its dense network of stores to partner with other companies that could benefit from offering their services through
Lawson. The most prominent partnerships were with utility companies such as Tepco (electricity) and Tokyo Gas and with Yamato, Japan's leading C2C parcel-delivery service company. These deals created tremendous shared cost savings by allowing consumers to pay their electricity, gas and water bills, as well as to send and pick-up their parcels from the The reason expansion from a well-established one-sided firm can be a particularly powerful way of becoming a TSP (and eventually an MSP) is that this process avoids facing head-on the chicken-and-egg problem inherent to launching MSPs. Anyone having tried to introduce a new payment system knows it is exceedingly difficult to get both merchants and consumers to adopt it at the same time: one side will not come without the other. A business having a strong existing relationship with either side (merchants or consumers), which can be leveraged, is in a much better position to achieve that. as a one-sided search service but quickly realized that the technology which it used to enable consumers to search the web could also be used to reduce search costs between advertisers and consumers, hence the creation of AdWord and AdSense, the programs which allow it to offer and charge for search-related advertising. This invention was a quantum leap in advertising efficiency, which many think has put advertising through traditional media on a glide path to extinction. A car dealer advertising in the Yellow Pages pays for his ad being put in the directories that go to all consumers, including those who have no interest in cars whatsoever. By contrast, by placing a sponsored link with Google, the dealer only pays only when users click on his sponsored link, which implicitly means they have a much higher probability of being interested in purchasing a car.
The preceding arguments suggest that managers should revisit their way of thinking about when it makes sense for a company to cross industry boundaries. Conventional wisdom holds that it is generally good to focus on one industry or one tightly-knit set of activities.
After all, it is this practice that has traditionally created well-defined industries, each with its own star (General Motors, Toyota, Standard Oil, Procter & Gamble, IBM in the early era of computing, etc. 
Depth vs. breadth
Accordingly, we now turn to the case of companies starting off with an MSP (either as a start-up or from an established position) and looking to expand it.
10 Edy is a pre-paid electronic payment system created by bitWallet Inc. Before delving into the analysis of the factors that drive and limit depth and breadth of MSPs, it is useful to start with a mini-case study of spectacular MSP expansions.
The evolution of NTT DoCoMo's i-mode MSP 11
In February 1999, i-mode was created as a two-sided platform connecting subscribers to DoCoMo's mobile phone network and mobile Internet content providers. Prior to launch, DoCoMo had signed up 67 content providers, handpicked by Takeshi Natsuno, its chief strategist. Mr. Natsuno sought a diverse portfolio from the beginning. Mobile banking, perceived as vital to the success of i-mode, had 21 sites. The remaining 46 sites covered gaming, fortune telling, news, sports, airline information, train and other travel information, real estate listings and weather forecasts. This variety set the stage for a marketing campaign that emphasized the myriad of amazing things subscribers could do with their mobile phones -aside from making phone calls.
i-mode gained one million subscribers in 6 months, 5.6 million in one year and 32.2 million in three years -in August of 2005 their number stood at 45 million. That is a remarkable market penetration for a premium service in a nation with a population of 127 million. The content provider side today numbers over 93,000 sites.
i-mode's rapid success was first and foremost due to a deliberate strategy of thoroughly reducing shared costs incurred by content providers in making their offerings available to users. Indeed, DoCoMo was careful to incorporate many web industry standards into imode: compact-HTML for the creation of web pages; hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) for transmitting data between the phones and servers; the standard protocol (SSL) for transmitting the secure data needed for financial transactions over the internet. This made life particularly easy for content providers with existing Internet sites, which they could effortlessly port to i-mode. In addition, DoCoMo built a proprietary and sophisticated billing system, which was set up to charge users according to the amount of data they downloaded on the network rather than on the amount of time they spent online 12 . imode's innovative billing system was made available to some content providers and enabled them to charge small monthly fees for their services. Users got the convenience of a single monthly bill, while content providers got reliable billing service for a fraction of the cost of doing it themselves. DoCoMo chose to reduce asymmetric information regarding content quality through a simple two-tier certification system: a carefully selected subset of content providers (currently, 5,000 out of the 93,000 total) is deemed "official" by the operator, whereas the rest were not excluded, but were known to be unofficial, i.e. not endorsed by DoCoMo. Although there are no restrictions placed on non-official sites, there are certain privileges reserved to official content providers: they are directly listed on and easily accessible from the i-mode portal and they can piggy-back on i-mode's billing system in exchange for 9 percent of their i-mode revenues.
Over time, DoCoMo kept adding new features that made content and application development for i-mode easier and richer. In 2001, it included support for Sun Microsystems' Java programming language and launched i-appli, a service which allows users to download third-party Java software applications (games, e-commerce). Support for Macromedia's Flashplayer was added in the same way in April 2003. All subsequent i-mode handset models had Macromedia Flash Lite installed, allowing users to view interactive multimedia content, while Macromedia and DoCoMo released Flash content developer kits.
It is only after having significantly deepened its two-sided platform that DoCoMo embarked on a campaign of radical MSP expansions, which started with the addition of online auctions 13 and culminated with the addition of payment systems since June 2004: debit, with the Edy pre-paid e-wallet function, and credit, with the iD credit card brand. This allowed DoCoMo to add a third side to its platform: physical merchants, who clearly benefit from allowing users to pay with their handsets at their stores.
Still, as thorough and progressive as DoCoMo's MSP expansion strategy has been, it was by no means bulletproof. In particular, it left two doors open for KDDI's au service, imode's main competitor, which saw its market share go from 18 percent to 24 percent between 2002 and 2005 (i-mode went from 59 percent to 55 percent over the same period) due to its more rapid roll out of a 3G network, which made its content more appealing to users, and the Chaku-Uta-Full music download service for mobile, introduced in November 2004 14 (i-mode has yet to launch its own). Whether DoCoMo's leadership in mobile-based contact-less payment systems can generate sufficiently powerful indirect network externalities to trump the music service advantage of KDDI remains to be seen 15 .
What drives and what limits depth?
Before venturing out to bringing new sides on board the platform, MSPs need to make sure they create all the value they can deliver to their existing sides. Depth creates more value for existing constituents and intensifies indirect network effects by making transactions among them more efficient or more frequent or both. This renders the existing multiple sides "stickier" and less likely to be attracted away to other platforms. Consider the example of eBay, which started as a simple auction engine allowing buyers and sellers to transact. Over time it relentlessly deepened its platform offering by adding functionalities that reduced both search and shared costs for buyers and sellers. The most important ones were PayPal (acquired by eBay in 1999), which offered a convenient way to settle transactions, and the Feedback Forum, a system which reduced asymmetric information between buyers and sellers by allowing buyers to rate sellers and making ratings public.
In contrast, an illustration of the dangers of overlooking depth is provided by Ticketmaster, a two-sided platform serving consumers and event venues (concerts, sports, etc. A critical dimension of platform depth is quality certification, which, as we have mentioned above, serves to reduce the search costs due to asymmetric information between the MSP's multiple sides. One key decision that managers need to make is the strictness of the platform's certification policy: it should be driven by a careful assessment of the importance of quality relative to quantity within the relevant platform side(s). For example, the tight leash that videogame console manufacturers keep over game publication on their respective platforms has its historical roots in the 1983 "videogame crash." At the time, the popularity of the Atari VCS 2600 console had attracted large numbers of "fly-by-night" developers seeking a quick profit: they flooded the market with poor-quality VCScompatible games (that Atari did not anticipate and had no technological way of excluding), which undermined the consumer experience and drove high-quality games out of the market.
This led to a collapse of videogame and console sales and ultimately to Atari's bankruptcy.
Having learnt from this expensive disaster, Nintendo pioneered the security chip and the "seal of quality", designed to allow the platform provider to lock out any undesirable games from getting published on its console. Since then, all console manufacturers with no exception have adopted this model, although today there are large numbers of specialized magazines, which rate and review games, making a 1983-like crash highly unlikely, even in the absence of centralized platform control. The reason behind the persistence of the lock-out policy is that consoles need top-notch games taking full advantage of and showing off their graphics capabilities, which are considered to be the key drivers of console sales.
By contrast, in the case of NTT DoCoMo's i-mode service, the diversity of content was paramount: quality also mattered of course, but to a lesser relative degree, which is why NTT DoCoMo has chosen a simple two-tier certification system (official and non-official), with no exclusion.
The second key decision regarding certification is whether this function should be centralized -i.e. performed by the MSP -as in the videogame and i-mode examples, or decentralized -i.e. enabled by the MSP but performed by the platform constituents themselves. The latter approach was pioneered by eBay and also adopted by Internet video sites such as YouTube and Google Video: it allows buyers or users to rate sellers or content providers. Decentralization is a more sensible choice when information about "quality" is itself decentralized, i.e. when the MSP does not have a clear informational advantage over platform constituents.
As valuable as platform depth may be, there comes a point when too much of a good thing can become harmful. One pitfall is attempting to "overdo" cost reductions or seeing cost reductions where there are none (or too few). It is interesting to use eBay as an illustration yet again, this time with its 2005 Skype acquisition. On the face of it, voice over IP seems to contribute to reducing transactions costs between buyers and sellers even further, which was the main reason behind the acquisition. As it turns out however, many users were turned off by the availability of voice communication, which they felt put unnecessary pressure on them to use it -a potential intrusion in the comfortable anonymity of trading on the Internet. This illustrates how attempts to excessively deepen platform functionalities may create negative externalities as opposed to the positive ones MSPs are looking for.
Closely related to this point, one needs to be flexible when deepening shared cost reductions and not attempt to impose them on everyone even if they appear to be very valuable to some constituents. When it first launched Xbox Live, the online gaming platform associated with its Xbox console, Microsoft had designed the service as a closed proprietary system, complete with a standardized user interface (gamers had one single user identification no matter what game they played), billing system and middleware, all of which were imposed on third-party developers wishing to make their games playable online by Xbox users. By contrast, arch-rival Sony had adopted the opposite strategy for PlayStation 2's online gaming service: aside from a network adapter that PlayStation 2 users had to purchase from Sony in order to obtain online capability, each developer had complete control over the user online gaming experience for his game. This naturally resulted in much less standardization of the online user experience across games. Microsoft's approach was a very attractive proposition for small developers, since it saved them significant expenditures in infrastructure (a clear shared cost saving), although they paid a price in flexibility. It was a different story with large game developers -Electronic Arts (EA) in particular -, who preferred to design and run their own online games as they saw fit. Indeed, EA was reluctant to subscribe to a Microsoft-controlled service that limited its ability to differentiate itself from competing game developers. should be left outside (in some cases to be provided by third parties) is critically determined by the MSP customer groups' demand for standardization on particular features. This demand can be very hard to ascertain ex-ante. However it is useful to keep in mind that oftentimes the main reason for which attempts to introduce standardization may provoke discontent among certain MSP constituents is that it inherently reduces their ability to differentiate themselves from each other, and thereby lowers the value they derive from being on board the MSP. The Xbox example above is a good illustration of this issue.
The risk of overdoing cost reductions also exists for search costs, though it can operate in more subtle ways. Here it is useful to start with a non-technological example: the design of Roppongi Hills, an 11.6 ha "mini-city" in the center of Tokyo, opened in April 2003 and encompassing upscale shopping space filled with trendy apparel stores, an eclectic mix of restaurants (Japanese and foreign), a spectacular Virgin Toho Cinemas movie theater, an outdoor arena for various cultural events, a television studio, two residential buildings, coffee shops, a book and DVD store and, last but not least, a spectacular landmark building hosting premium office space as well as a library, a cultural academy, an observatory and an art museum. This grandiose MSP attracts 45 million visitors every year and many of themincluding employees of tenant firms -observe (without necessarily complaining) that it is very difficult to find a specific place in the complex and very easy to get lost in the maze of levels, stores, cafes and restaurants. This is not negligence on the part of Mori Building, the developer of Roppongi Hills: if it had wanted to design the complex in order to minimize search costs between visitors and shops, Roppongi Hills would look quite different today.
Instead, the developer believed that it would create more value by allowing room for "random encounters", i.e. by inducing visitors to explore the complex. This particularly benefited some of the up-and-coming trendy shops located within the complex, which did not have a well-known brand name yet -but not necessarily the well-established ones, such as Zara and Louis Vuitton. This is one of many examples of balancing acts that Mori Building had to perform in designing Roppongi Hills to please its various constituents: its visitors are willing to tolerate some wandering around before finding their destination and in the process run into unanticipated shops and restaurants that may turn out to be of some interest. 
What drives and what limits breadth? (aka MSP imperialism 16 )
Whereas MSPs benefit from going deep in their functionalities to generate more value from the same sources, breadth of MSPs platforms is driven by the quest for unlocking new sources of value and creating new indirect network effects with the addition of new sides to the MSP. It can also be driven by the sheer necessity to survive: if your MSP does not expand into a new functionality or customer group, another platform, which already serves that group, might attack your home base by expanding in the reverse direction.
These are powerful reasons to expand platform breadth and they have led many MSPs, particularly in the technology sector, to imperialistically cross industry boundaries, which is the fundamental driving mechanism behind the "digital convergence" phenomenon (mobile phones, PDAs, digital music players and payment devices; PCs, television sets and videogame consoles), with disruptive implications for entire industries.
Aside from i-mode's entry into credit payment systems, another example of radical MSP expansions is found in the videogame industry. At least since the last generation Precisely because MSP strategies take companies into unfamiliar territories, it is oftentimes important to proceed with caution and not assume that bringing about indirect network effects will be sufficient to compensate for a lack of relevant industry expertise. In fact, a "veni, vidi, vici"- on the other hand it was also an intimidating factor for some who did not wish to compete with SAP on a platform owned and controlled by SAP. The company's executives recognized this issue and decided this potential conflict of interest could be managed: in other words, they decided that SAP did not have to choose between being either an application company or a platform company, but could in fact be both at the same time. SAP created industry groups containing enterprise customers from every specific industry, ISVs offering software solutions for that industry and members of SAP's corresponding industry solutions division. Within these industry groups SAP adopted the policy of clearly and credibly committing from the outset to those areas of enterprise software it planned to explore (as well as to the time horizon) and to those fields which it would entirely stay away from. This transparency made it considerably easier to attract third-party ISVs to NetWeaver.
Meanwhile, NTT DoCoMo opted to pre-empt all conflicts of interest with its content providers from the outset by deciding never to produce its own content, i.e. by limiting itself to being a pure platform, not a media company. It is interesting to contrast this approach with that adopted by Vodafone when trying to introduce a wireless 3G service in Europe similar to i-mode, around the same time the Japanese service was launched. would be quick to join. This never happened as third-parties were put off by Vizzavi's "closed garden" approach to content, which heavily favored Universal. Not surprisingly, despite Vodafone's and Vivendi's investment of 1.6 billion euros in Vizzavi, the portal's revenue and subscriber growth were both disappointing. After one year of operation Vizzavi had 2 million subscribers compared to i-mode's 5.6 million subscribers, and after about two 
Conclusion
The MSP design issues on which we have focused on in this article precede and oftentimes directly determine the choice of business models -pricing, distribution, etc.
Strategic design defines the relevant space in which the MSP is operating, its multiple constituents and its competitors -actual and potential -in a word, its relevant ecosystem.
However, designing and expanding MSPs is a complex and daunting process. Most importantly, it is a dynamic one: the most successful MSPs do not sit still; they are constantly evolving, increasing their depth and/or reach and in the process redefining their boundaries and those of entire industries. This is especially true for MSPs in high technology markets, but, as we have seen above, even very traditional businesses can unlock powerful sources of indirect network effects -with a little technological help and a good amount of creativity. The devil is, as usual, in the details -mapping a firm's individual operations into the three fundamental functions, using them to identify where "frictions" in interactions between existing and potentially new sides are and, finally, carefully choosing new activities that provide the largest possible search or shared cost savings leading to indirect network effects, all the while minimizing conflicts of interest on all fronts. The framework exposed above (and synthesized in the diagram included in the appendix) should be particularly useful in this context, as it induces systematic analysis of MSP strategic opportunities and the critical tradeoffs involved, based on fundamental economic functions and cutting across any specific industry setting.
